Special Category Army With Air Force (SCARWAF)
On 18 Sep 1947, the United States Air Force (USAF) stood up as a separate service, replacing the Army Air Corps as the United States’ airborne force. This transition to the USAF included responsibility for operation and maintenance of its installations and airfields worldwide. Conversely, the US Army was designated as the construction agent for the USAF as well as the agent for acquisition and disposal of real estate.
In 1947, the US Air Force’s Far East Air Force (FEAF) needed to upgrade older airfields and build new airfields to support operations in Korea. After the split between the Army and Air Force in 1947, there was no provision for specialized semi-skilled and skilled troops to perform this type of task. Special Category Army Personnel With Air Force (SCARWAF) was a provisional Army and Air Force unit that provided personnel who would perform these construction duties. (Lambert, 1 January 2011)
In June 1953, the Secretary of the Air Force proposed again to the Secretary of the Army to transfer the SCARWAF units to the Air Force. Lt General George E. Stratemeyer, who served as Commander of the Far East Air Forces, argued that “the low combat effectiveness index of these units prior to the emergency has been confirmed under combat conditions. Had the Engineer Aviation units been operationally ready as were our fighter and light bomber units, the Engineer Battalions could have been utilized immediately in Korea as were our combat units. Had they been United States Air Force units, I feel certain they would have been operationally ready. I am left no alternative but to strongly urge the transfer of all responsibilities pertaining to Aviation Units to the Air Force.” (Ashdown, May 1984)
The Secretary of the Army agreed to the proposal in January 1954 and it was sent to the Secretary of Defense for signature in February 1954. (Installations History, 1954) According to Major General Guy H. Goddard, “we had hopes that eventually it would be an all blue-suit unit, but the crunch of spaces precluded that and it never came about.” (Goddard, 2003) The fate of SCARWAF lay in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A three-person working group was established in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to study the problem. General Washbourne briefed the working group in March 1955 and both the Army and the Air Force answered extensive questions about the workings of the program. The Department of the Army withdrew its previous concurrence with the transfer and instead proposed that aviation engineer functions remain assigned to the Army.
On December 2, 1955, the Deputy Secretary of the DoD, Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., made the decision and issued a memorandum declaring that SCARWAF would be eliminated, and that the Army would retain all aviation engineer personnel. The December 2, 1955 memorandum signed by Deputy Secretary Robertson, Jr., abruptly stated: “I have been advised that the SCARWAF arrangement is unsatisfactory because it is administratively cumbersome, is not sufficiently responsive to the needs of either the Air Force or the Army, and its costs are excessive and not commensurate with values received.” The specifics of the elimination of SCARWAF were stated in the memorandum: “(1) the SCARWAF category is abolished and all SCARWAF units and Army personnel will be returned by the Department of the Air Force to the operational direction and control of the Department of the Army, (2) the Department of the Army will be responsible for providing overseas military construction support to the Air Force.” The letter further specified that these two requirements be completed by March 1, 1956. (Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., 1955) Four SCARWAF units remaining in Europe were inactivated in February 1956; the remaining 10 were reassigned to the Army in March 1956. (AFCEC History Office (AHO), 2005) Twenty-four thousand engineers detailed to the Air Force returned to the Army. (Military Notes Around the World, February 1965)
During the dissolution of SCARWAF, the Air Force and the Army discussed their respective roles in troop construction in overseas contingency situations and the numbers of troop requirements forecast by the Air Force. For FY58, the Air Force requested the support of six Army engineer battalions during peacetime. The Army questioned this requirement as too large. Yet, even while the Army argued vigorously to retain the role of providing troop construction to the Air Force, it was reducing manpower and the overall number of its engineer battalions due to budget cuts and the implementation of a new plan. (Wylie, November 1962) The new plan authorized 7,500 Army engineers to support both Air Force and Army needs during contingency situations. Air Force requirements needed to be met in the earliest stages of a typical contingency situation, while Army needs occurred later in time. Therefore, the 7,500 Army engineers were calculated to be enough personnel to meet the maximum requirements of both the Air Force and Army at any one time after mobilization began. (Military Notes Around the World, February 1965) The remaining troop spaces previously used by the Air Force were placed in the Army Reserves. (Single Army-Air Force Engineer Service, Vol 48 No 321 January-February 1956)
In a memo dated September 29, 1955, the Secretary of the Air Force informed the Secretary of Defense that it was incumbent on the Air Force to incorporate within its structure the capability to restore combat operations on a limited emergency basis following enemy attack. A new organizational concept was outlined in the memo that allocated 7,000 additional spaces to the Air Force to implement a bomb damage recovery plan. In a January 3, 1956, meeting with the Director of Operations and the Director of Logistics Plans, the chief of the Installations Engineer Division agreed to provide a detailed plan to develop Air Force bomb damage repair capabilities. The plan submitted for staffing on January 5, 1956 proposed augmenting installations squadrons at a number of war mission bases and placing additional cadres of supervisors and technicians at several non-primary target bases. These personnel would be equipped with equipment from the SCARWAF program and reserved for Air Force use in case of enemy attack, emergency, or natural disaster. (AFCEC History Office, January-June 1956)
The proposed plan submitted to the Secretary of the Air Force to gain additional personnel authorizations to develop an internal capability for bomb damage repair was unsuccessful because of higher priority requirements. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Installations then turned to the major commands to establish the new mission within current personnel allocations. An installations engineer conference was held in October 1956 in Washington, D.C., where various aspects of the new mission assignment were discussed, and ideas exchanged. An outline of a base recovery plan was developed and presented at the conference. A letter dated October 31, 1956 was distributed to major commands that provided initial data to assist in developing requirements for feasible recovery operations. The Table of Allowances for Installations Engineer equipment was amended to include 22 items for the effort by November 1956. Although it was recognized that other Air Force elements were involved in implementing a full-scale disaster recovery plan, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Installations pressed forward to establish Installation Reserve units, emergency survival component items, new disaster-survival standard airfield criteria, and training for installations personnel in post-attack decontamination and repair procedures. (AFCEC History Office, 1956)
In February 1957, DoD Directive 1315.6 entitled Responsibilities for Military Troop Construction Support of the Department of the Air Force was issued to clarify the responsibilities for airfield construction and maintenance in overseas contingency situations. This directive stated:
- The Department of the Army is responsible for providing military troop construction support to the Air Force overseas, including:
- Organizing, manning, training, equipping, maintaining, directing, and controlling all units and personnel, including those of the reserve components, required to provide this support.
- Budgeting and funding for the required units.
- The Department of the Air Force is responsible for developing and maintaining a capability for the emergency repair of bomb-damaged air bases within the organic capability of air installations resources. A limited number of specialists may be provided and additionally to supervise development of this capability. (Moe, 1985)
Once again, the Air Force was without dedicated construction units and was forced to rely upon the Army during times of war. But the window of opportunity was given to the Air Force engineers to develop an organic capability for emergency repair to Air Force installations apart from Army assistance.
Prime BEEF
In December 1963, the Civil Engineering Manpower Study Group was formed. The purpose of the group was to “determine the distribution, alignment, reliability, credibility, and skills required in the Civil Engineering Manpower resource to perform essential Civil Engineer functions in support of the Air Force mission.” (Nethercot, 1973)
The most significant result of the manpower study was the creation of the Base Engineer Emergency Forces, known as Prime BEEF. The name was coined by General Price. According to General Meredith,
I said to General Price, “We’ve got to come up with a name for this thing.” He said, “I’ve been thinking about it.” And he’s the man who named Prime BEEF. He said, “Prime BEEF.” I said, “Tell me what it stands for.” He said, “Prime, meaning the first force, prima. And BEEF—base engineer emergency force.” And that’s where it stuck. (Meredith, 2001)
The 1964 Formal Report of the Civil Engineering Manpower Study Group explained the three military missions of Prime BEEF:
- A minimum force of military civil engineers must be maintained at each air base, missile squadron/wing, depot or station, world-wide to maintain essential O&M services during and immediately following enemy attack, periods of imminent attack, major fires, floods and other emergency conditions.
- A force of military civil engineers must be attached to each flying unit which is designated for performance of emergency missions from an unoccupied, bare or dispersed operating base. This force of civil engineers must maintain its integrity and be prepared to proceed or accompany the flying unit for which it will provide essential O&M services under emergency conditions.
- A force of Military Civil Engineers must be trained in pioneer environments and be prepared to participate in unforeseen Contingencies and Special Air Warfare operations such as occurred during the Berlin, Cuba, and Southeast Asia crises. (CE Manpower Study Group, 1964)
The Prime BEEF program was initiated through a September 27, 1964 letter to all major commands on the subject of “Civil Engineer Military Manpower Requirements from the Directorate of Civil Engineering.” The schedule proposed for implementing Prime BEEF was April 1965, but the program took years to implement. The U.S. Congress approved the program in October 1964. (Nethercot, 1973) By 1965, 70 Prime BEEF teams were formed.
Project Prime BEEF was a major success in realigning Air Force manpower in emergency and contingency situations and expanding the civil engineer role beyond the maintenance and operations functions associated with stateside Air Force bases. In the early years of the program, Mobile Prime BEEF teams were employed widely to support civil engineering activities in South Vietnam. In CONUS, all major Air Force bases had a Prime BEEF Recovery Team trained as first responders in natural disasters. Recovery Teams provided support to their home bases, other Air Force bases and the surrounding community. General Curtin reiterated,
Prime BEEF is … an Air Force-wide program to assure that our total Civil Engineering force is in proper balance and can provide responsive support to all short-term emergencies as well as meet our normal day-to-day needs. Prime BEEF comprises the military manpower base in support of the Civil Engineering function. (Curtin M. G., February 1966)
RED HORSE
In a May 10, 1965 memorandum, the Secretary of Defense queried the Secretary of the Air Force regarding the Air Force capabilities for constructing an operational airfield in Vietnam within a month. The Secretary of Defense had information that the U.S. Marine Corps was building a four-squadron operational airfield on undeveloped acreage near Chou Lai, Republic of Vietnam, in 28 days. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara asked, “Does the Air Force have the similar capability? If not, what can be done to develop it?” (Defense, 1965)
At that time, the answer to the question was “no” due to the restrictions codified in the 1957 DoD directive 1315.6, which established that troop construction for the Air Force in contingency situations would be supplied by the Army. The Air Force was restricted to emergency repair of bomb-damaged air bases. The Air Force had no organic troop construction units and access to only limited Army troop construction units in the combat zone. The scarcity of Army troop construction units was traced to the Army decision to reduce the number of its dedicated troop construction units and assign construction duties to the Reserve and National Guard. During the Vietnam Conflict, a national policy decision was made not to mobilize Reserve and National Guard units. By June 1965, the first two “regular” Army construction battalions were active in South Vietnam. Army troop construction capability grew to 26 non-divisional battalions, but these troops were committed to meeting Army requirements and provided only limited support to the Air Force. (Air Force Historical Research Agency, 1 January 1965 – 31 December 1969)
Troop construction support was preferred for operating in a combat zone. Troops were trained to operate in austere conditions, around potential enemies, and, in the case of Airmen, around operating airfields. Contractors typically were tied to fixed bases, required security, and were focused on specific projects. Construction troops, on the other hand, were broadly trained and were deployable wherever needed. (Air Force Historical Research Agency, 1 January 1965 – 31 December 1969)
Major General Robert H. Curtin began to cultivate the construction capabilities suggested by the Secretary of Defense. Further incentive to address construction support within the Air Force was provided by an August 11, 1965 letter from Colonel Henry J. “Fritz” Stehling, command civil engineer at PACAF, to Air Force Headquarters outlining the requirements in Southeast Asia for heavy construction and repair capability based on the current conditions of the buildup. (Ashdown, May 1984) General Curtin was under additional pressures from his own boss, General LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, who wanted two or three more bases built in the Republic of Vietnam. According to General Curtin, “[General LeMay] said, ‘You’ve got to get them built.’ I said, ‘All right.’ He said, ‘Our commanders over there can’t handle it. You’ve got to get in the act.’ So, I got in the act.” After checking with the U.S. Army Chief of Engineers and the Navy, General Curtin knew that those agencies were overwhelmed with construction requirements of their own. He said, “We have no choice. We’ve got to do this, and the only way we can do it is heavy maintenance, and if we have to do some construction with heavy maintenance, we’ll just have to let the definitions stand by themselves.” (Meredith, 2001)
The Civil Engineering Directorate began work on the issue and on September 14, 1965 completed a study entitled, “Prime BEEF Heavy Repair Squadrons.” The study’s objectives were:
- To create a rapid response capability, within the Air Force, to augment base engineer forces in the event of heavy bomb damage or disasters, as well as accomplish major repairs where contract capability is not readily available. As a by-product of this capability “expeditionary airfields,” [sic] using AM-2 matting, and austere cantonment facilities could be built.
- To create a capability which would not duplicate any existing effort, but “fill the gap” until this effort is made available to the Air Force.
- To create a capability that will remain organic to the Air Force
General Curtin described the purpose of the civil engineering squadrons,
These squadrons (400 officers and men each) are to provide a continuing on-site and heavier capability to meet operational Civil Engineer needs of the ‘combat zone.’ … [T]hese units fill an existing gap in the broad spectrum of Civil Engineering capabilities needed by the Air Force to support its operational missions. Individual replacements for these units will be provided via our Prime BEEF concept but otherwise there is no relationship between these large PCS (permanent change of station) units and our small TDY Prime BEEF teams. (Curtin M. G., February 1966)
According to General Meredith, the Air Force “had to develop a concise, hard-hitting, combat ready, highly skilled, mobile, and self-contained unit that could survive under the most demanding missions, worldwide.” These were self-sufficient squadrons that were fully equipped and provisioned. The timetable to form the new civil engineer squadrons was aggressive – 60 days to select, train, equip, and deploy the new civil engineer squadrons. The experiences of aviation engineers during World War II were in the minds of several participants in setting up the new squadrons. (Meredith, 2001) (Mayes, 2000)
General Meredith described how the Civil Engineering Squadrons were named RED HORSE,
One day we said, “What are we going to call this?” Warrant Officer John Bennett … was my heavy equipment man. He and [Col Truman] O’Keefe and I were sitting there and he said, “What’s faster than a bull?” You know we had the black bull as a symbol for Prime BEEF. I said, “A horse.” He said, “What color do you like?” I said, “Red.” It took us two days to come up with the acronym, Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer. (Meredith, 2001)
The overall recommendations were to immediately develop two Prime BEEF Heavy Repair squadrons from existing Air Force resources. The new civil engineer squadrons were activated on October 1, 1965 by the Secretary of the Air Force and were named RED HORSE. (Department of the Air Force, 1965)
The exact definition of the RED HORSE acronym has experienced numerous permutations over the years. Air Force Regulation 85-25, Project RED HORSE, that formally established the RED HORSE program, defined it as Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operations Repair Squadrons, Engineer. A 1966 article in the Air Force Civil Engineer Magazine that introduced the concept to the career field identified it as Rapid Engineer Deployment, Heavy Operational Repair Squadrons, Engineering. Air Force Regulation 93-9 offered another alternative in 1983, Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer. Finally, in 1988, RED HORSE was adopted as an approved nickname and no longer had to be identified as an acronym. In June 2011, Maj. Gen. Timothy A. Byers, The Air Force Civil Engineer, reaffirmed this change and approved the use of RED HORSE as a nickname.
Bibliography
AFCE. (May 1966). Project RED HORSE. AFCE Magazine, Vol 7, No 2.
AFCEC History Office (AHO). (2005). SCARWAF Units in Europe. Tyndall AFB, FL: AFCEC.
AFCEC History Office. (1956, July-December). Installations History. Assistant Chief of Staff. Tyndall AFB, FL: AFCEC History Office.
AFCEC History Office. (January-June 1956). Installations History. Assistant Chief of Staff, Installations History. AFCEC History Office.
Air Force Historical Research Agency. (1 January 1965 – 31 December 1969). USAF Logistics Activities in Support of Operations on Southeast Asia – Project Corona Harvest. Maxwell AFB, AL: AFHRA.
Ashdown, L. C. (May 1984). A History of the Warfighting Capablity of Air Force Civil Engineering. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College Air University.
Curtin, M. G. (2003). Oral History Interview. (L. E. Hartzer, Interviewer) Tyndall AFB, FL: HQ AFCESA.
Curtin, M. G. (February 1966). The Diretor Says … Prime BEEF Teams … ‘Excellent’. AFCE, Vol 7, No 1.
Defense, S. o. (1965, May 10). Memorandum for the Secretary of the Air Force. USAF.
Department of the Air Force, H. U. (1 October 1965). Activation of the 554th and 555th Civil Engienering Squadrons (Heavy Repair). Headquarters U.S. Air Force.
Installations History. (1954, January-June). Assistant Chief of Staff, Installations History. AFCEC History Office.
Lambert, T. (1 January 2011). The Men of K-2 in the Forgotten War. Little Miami Publishing.
Mayes, B. G. (2000). Oral History Interview. (L. E. Walker, Interviewer) Tyhndall AFB, FL: HQ AFCESA.
Military Notes Around the World. (February 1965). Military Review, 68.
Moe, C. L. (1985). A History of Air Force Civil Engineer Wartime and Contingency Problems from 1941 to the Present. A History of Air Force Civil Engineer Wartime and Contingency Problems from 1941 to the Present. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: AFIT Air University.
Peer, E. E. (November 1961). Operation Cool School, AFCE, Vol 2, No 4. AFCE.
Reuben B. Robertson, Jr. (1955, December 2). Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force. Special Category, Army Units with Air Force (SCARWAF). Washington D.C.: AHO.
Single Army-Air Force Engineer Service. (Vol 48 No 321 January-February 1956). The Military Engineer, 61.
Walker, L. E. (2001). Oral History Interview. (B. G. Retired), Interviewer) Tyndall AFB, FL.
Wylie, L. C. (November 1962). AFCE Professional Education and TWI Programs. AFCE Magazine, Vol 3, No 4.